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INTRODUCTION
Around the world, law school clinics are playing an increasingly important role in training future
lawyers and providing access to the courts for traditionally underrepresented individuals and
groups. Today, there are law school clinical programs on the continents of Africa, Asia, Australia,
Europe, North America and South America, and each year brings clinical education to more
countries – most recently Japan.1 In the United States, which has had clinical programs for several
decades, student practice rules in every jurisdiction permit law students to represent clients in and
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1 Japan may be the most recent country to initiate
clinical legal education programs, following the
adoption of a new system of graduate professional
legal education as part of reforms “for the purposes of
‘clarifying the role to be played by justice in Japanese
society in the 21st century and examining and
deliberating fundamental measures necessary for the
realization of a justice system that is easy for the
people to utilize, participation by the people in the
justice system, achievement of a legal profession as it
should be and strengthening the functions thereof, and
other reforms of the justice system, as well as
improvements in the infrastructure of that system.’”
Recommendations of the Justice System Reform
Council – For a Justice System to Support Japan in the
21st Century – at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
judiciary/2001/0612report.html (last visited June 3,
2005) (quoting article 2, Paragraph 1 of the Law
concerning Establishment of the Justice System Reform
Council) [hereinafter Justice System Reform
Recommendations]. The new law schools are a
cornerstone of the reforms designed to “bridge between
theoretical education and practical education,” and to
provide law students with the opportunity to acquire
the specialized legal knowledge, lawyering skills, and
professional values “necessary for solving actual legal
problems.” Id. at ch. III, pt. 2. Some of the new law
schools have already instituted clinical courses in
which law school faculty and students provide legal
assistance to clients. See, e.g., Takao Suami, Clinical
Legal Education and the Foundation of Japanese
Law Schools in the Context of Judicial System Reform
(April 15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (describing the judicial reforms in Japan
the importance of clinical legal education for
Japanese law schools).
out of court,2 effectively making them “student-lawyers.”3 Through their representation of clients,
law students in clinical programs experience the practice of law and learn the important lawyering
skills and professional values needed to be competent, effective lawyers.4 The student-lawyers in
clinical programs, and their supervising clinical faculty, also experience issues that other lawyers
representing poor and sometimes unpopular clients face – interference with the selection and
representation of clients designed to deny legal services in some matters to those unable to afford
to hire other lawyers.5
For more than thirty-five years, clinical programs in the United States have faced political
interference and attacks by elected officials, business groups, and others for providing poor people
access to the courts on matters including redress of racial discrimination, prisoner rights litigation,
death penalty cases, and environmental issues. In each instance, the political interference has
sought to subvert the legal process by preventing clinical programs from representing their clients
rather than having the courts rule on the legal merits of their clients’ claims. The political
interference with law school clinic client representation also appears to be part of the broader
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2 In 1969, the American Bar Association (ABA)
promulgated a Model Student Practice Rule to
facilitate the growth of clinical courses in United
States law schools. See Proposed Model Rule Relative
to Legal Assistance by Law Students, A.B.A. Rep.
290, 290 (1969) [hereinafter Proposed Model Rule].
The dual jurisdictional system of separate state courts
and federal courts in the United States results in each
separate jurisdiction having the power to regulate the
student practice of law before the courts within the
jurisdiction. The high court in each state, usually
called the state supreme court, regulates the practice of
law before all the trial and appellate courts within the
state. In contrast, in the federal system each individual
federal court has the authority to adopt its own student
practice rule that applies only to those clinical students
who appear before it. See George K. Walker, A Model
Rule for Student Practice in the United States Courts,
37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1101, 1106-13 (1980).
All fifty states, plus the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico, have adopted student practice rules. See
Joan W. Kuruc & Rachel A. Brown, Student Practice
Rules in the United States, 63 B. EXAMINER, No.
3, at 40, 40–41 (1994). In addition, almost every
federal court has adopted some form of a student
practice rule or permits law students to appear upon
motion with the court. See Jorge deNeve, Peter A. Joy
& Charles D. Weisselberg, Submission of the
Association of American Law Schools to the Supreme
Court of the State of Louisiana Concerning the
Review of the Supreme Court’s Student Practice Rule,
4 CLINICAL L. REV. 539, 549–50 (1998). 
3 In the United States, law students must be admitted to
practice under a state jurisdiction’s or federal court’s
student practice rule or order before they are legally
and ethically able to provide legal representation to
clients or claim to be “student-lawyers.” Clinical
programs often enroll other students who are not
admitted to the limited practice of law under a student
practice rule, but these clinical students must function
as lawyer assistants or law clerks and not as student-
lawyers authorized to provide legal advice and other
legal representation to clients. See Peter A. Joy &
Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency
Issues in Law Clinic Practice, 9 CLINICAL L. REV.
493, 497 (2002). 
4 A study by the ABA identified ten fundamental
lawyering skills and four fundamental professional
values essential for the competent, professional
representation of clients. See SECTION ON
LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT – A CONTINUUM
138–41(1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]. The
ten fundamental lawyering skills are: problem solving;
legal analysis and reasoning; legal research; factual
investigation; communication; counseling;
negotiation; dispute resolution; organization and
management of legal work; and resolving ethical
dilemmas. See id. at 138–40. The four fundamental
values of the legal profession are: providing competent
representation; promoting justice, fairness, and
morality; improving the profession; and fostering
professional self-development. See id. at 140–41.
5 Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique
of Interference in Law School Clinics, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1974 (2003). The
interference is typically designed to prevent the
bringing of certain types of cases, such as
environmental or civil rights legal claims, or bringing
or defending lawsuits against certain defendants, such
as businesses or governmental entities, more that
focusing on denying legal representation of certain
clients. See infra Part IB. The net effect of this
interference, however, is such that it would deny those
clients unable to afford to pay for legal assistance
access to the courts. 
attacks on public interest lawyers and other lawyers representing clients in disputes with
governmental entities, business interest, or other more powerful adversaries. 
The extent to which clinical programs in other countries currently face or will face political
interference in the representation of their clients is unclear. Even if political interference in clinical
programs is not yet a pressing issue in some countries, an analysis of political interference may be
helpful to law faculty currently teaching in or working to implement clinical programs for at least
three reasons. First, from a comparative law perspective, understanding the nature of political
interference in clinical programs outside of one’s own country may afford useful insights to foster
critical thinking about the relationship between the role of lawyers in providing access to the
courts and the role of clinical legal education in acculturating law students to the legal profession.
Second, the increasing internationalisation of law makes understanding the experiences in other
countries vital to being a legal educator in the 21st century, and understanding clinical legal
education issues in other countries makes clinical educators more effective teachers. Finally,
understanding the types of political interference and the responses to political interference in the
United States may prove useful to clinical faculty in other countries experiencing similar attacks
on their work in clinical courses. 
This article reviews the history of political interference in clinical programs in the United States,
considers the attacks on clinical programs in the context of attacks on other lawyers representing
the poor or other marginalized clients, and draws lessons from the experience in the United States
that may be helpful to clinical programs in other countries.6 With the spread of clinical teaching
throughout the world, it is likely that law faculty teaching clinical courses in other countries may
encounter the types of political interference with client and case selection experienced by their
colleagues in the United States. 
Part I of this article examines the access to justice mission of clinical legal education in the United
States and briefly traces the history and types of political interference in law school clinical
programs. It also discusses the ethical obligations of lawyers to represent unpopular or
controversial clients or causes, and considers how the attacks on clinical programs interfere with a
lawyer’s ethical obligation to act independently of third-party interests. 
Part II examines the relationship between access to justice and the attacks on the major sources of
public interest lawyers in the United States. Part II contends that access to the courts is a
cornerstone principle for the rule of law, and access to the courts depends on having the assistance
of a lawyer. Part II draws a connection between the political interference in clinical programs and
other attacks on public interest lawyers.
Part III analyzes the legacy of political interference on clinical programs. It discusses the effects of
both the highly publicized attacks on clinical programs and the more frequent questions
concerning clinical programs’ choices of clients and cases. It argues that the breadth of political
interference in clinical programs in the United States indicates that any clinical program may be
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6 This article builds upon some ideas I have explored in previously published articles. See generally Peter A. Joy & Charles
D. Weisselberg, Access to Justice, Academic Freedom, and Political Interference: A Clinical Program Under Siege, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 531 (1998) (discussing the nexus between academic freedom, access to the courts, and political
interference with clinical programs); Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access
to Justice, 74 TULANE L. REV. 235 (1999) (examining the role of law school clinics in providing access to justice and
attacks on law school clinics); Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5 (examining the history and ethics of political interference in
law school clinics).
targeted even if the clinical faculty believe that they are taking non-controversial cases. Part III also
questions whether political interference in clinical programs will be as great an issue in those
countries that make legal assistance in civil cases more available to persons who are unable to afford
to hire a lawyer than does the Unites States.
The article concludes that law school clinical programs can model the highest ideals of the legal
profession by evaluating potential cases on the legal merits and pedagogical value and not with a
concern for whether or not the case or client may be controversial. 
I. INTERFERENCE IN LAW SCHOOL CLINIC CASE AND CLIENT
SELECTION
A. Access to Justice Mission of Clinical Legal Education in the United States
Clinical legal education in the United States has existed for more than one hundred years in some
form, and it has its roots in law students setting up volunteer legal aid bureaus or dispensaries to
assist persons unable to afford to hire attorneys.7 By the early 1950s, clinical pedagogy was becoming
accepted both as a valuable means for exposing “the law student to actual problems . . . [of] actual
people who are in actual trouble”8 and as a way of advancing “equality of justice” by helping to
develop throughout the country “an adequate system of legal aid offices.”9 From its earliest
development, clinical legal education in the United States has included an access to justice mission.
Clinical legal education developed at a much more rapid pace starting in the 1960s, and the social
justice mission of providing access to the courts remained a primary goal. Starting in 1959 and
continuing through 1978, the Ford Foundation provided approximately $13 million in grants and
other assistance to over 100 law schools through a program which was eventually known as the
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR).10 William Pincus, who
directed CLEPR, stressed that access to the courts or “a concern with justice for all” was a
86
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7 The first clinical programs in the United States were
started in the late 1890s and early 1900s as non-
credit, volunteer legal aid bureaus or legal dispensaries
run by law students at a small number of law schools.
See John S. Bradway, The Nature of a Legal Aid
Clinic, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 174 (1930); William
V. Rowe, Legal Clinics and Better Trained Lawyers –
A Necessity, 11 ILL. L. REV. 591, 591 (1917).
8 Robert G. Storey, Law School Legal Aid Clinics:
Foreward, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 533, 533 (1951).
9 Id. at 534. A 1951 study of clinical legal education
programs identified twenty-eight clinics run by law
schools, independent legal aid societies, or public
defender offices. See Quintin Johnstone, Law School
Clinics, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535, 535 (1951). Most
of the law schools offered clinics as elective courses or
extracurricular activities. See id. at 541–42.
10 From 1959 to 1965, the Ford Foundation made a total
$500,000 in grants to nineteen law schools through a
program entitled the National Council on Legal
Clinics (NCLC). See Orison S. Marden, CLEPR:
Origins and Programs, in COUNCIL ON LEGAL
EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, CLINICAL EDUCATION
FOR THE LAW STUDENT: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN A SERVICE SETTING 3, 3
(1973) [hereinafter CLINICAL EDUCATION
FOR THE LAW STUDENT]. In 1965, the Ford
Foundation provided an additional $950,000 to
NCLC and renamed NCLC the Council on
Education in Professional Responsibility, which was
renamed the Council on Legal Education for
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) in 1968. See id.
at 3, 6–7. The Ford Foundation granted an additional
$11 million to CLEPR, which awarded 209 grants
equaling approximately $7 million to 107 ABA-
approved law schools from 1968 through 1978. See
Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy,
Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third
Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 19 (2000). Other
CLEPR support for clinical programs in law schools
consisted of teaching materials, publications, and
conferences. Id. at 19 n.74. 
challenge for the legal profession,11 and CLEPR funded clinical programs “to make unique and
valuable contributions to the improvement of justice . . . generally to those most in need and least
able to afford them.”12 Orison Marden, Chair of CLEPR, explained that clinical legal education
was important to expose law students to “public responsibilities” of the legal profession “to serve
the poor as well as the rich, to work for reforms in the administration of justice, to be leaders in
their communities.”13 Marden also noted that law students needed to learn that lawyers “should
be willing to undertake the unpopular cause and to withstand with courage the disapproval of
unthinking people when they do so.”14
While CLEPR funded the growth of clinical programs with a purpose of providing legal assistance
to those in need of lawyers, members of the bench and bar also supported the development of
clinical legal education for access to justice reasons.15 To facilitate the spread of clinical legal
education courses and to enable law students to provide legal representation to clients, the
American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the ABA Model Student Practice Rule in 1969.16 In
creating the Model Student Practice Rule, the ABA stated that it had dual purposes to assist the
bench and bar “in providing competent legal services for . . . clients unable to pay for such services
and to encourage law schools to provide clinical instruction.”17
In addition to CLEPR and the legal profession supporting an access to justice mission of clinical
legal education in the 1960s, one commentator noted that the growth of clinical programs was also
motivated by “a desire on the part of a significant number of law students to help make the law
serve the needs of the poor.”18 Other commentators echo the role of law student activism by
attributing the growth of clinical legal education to the “social ferment of the 1960s,”19 and to the
growing appreciation for the role of law in addressing “the fundamental problems of
contemporary society.”20
Although CLEPR, the ABA, and law students all encouraged clinical programs to expand access to
justice by representing poor and unpopular clients and causes, as clinical programs fulfilled this
mission clinical faculty and their students found that some politicians, business interests, and
university officials would sometimes attack law school clinics for their choices of clients and cases.
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11 WILLIAM PINCUS, The Lawyer’s Professional
Responsibility, in CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
FOR LAW STUDENTS: ESSAYS 37, 38 (1980). 
12 WILLIAM PINCUS, A Statement on CLEPR’s
Program, in CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION
FOR LAW STUDENTS: ESSAYS, supra note 11, at
69, 70.
13 Marden, supra note 10, at 4.
14 Id.
15 For example, a former chief justice for the United
States Supreme Court called on law schools to expand
lawyering skills programs, and “provide society with
people oriented and problem oriented counselors and
advocates to meet the broad social needs of our
changing world.” See Warren E. Burger, The Special
Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of
Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 233–34
(1973). In addition, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed
that law student practice “has been praised by
members of the judiciary and encouraged by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, and we have
ample reason to extend our commendation.” Jordan v.
United States, 691 F.2d 514, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
16 Proposed Model Rule, supra note 2, at 290. Colorado
adopted a student practice rule in 1909, but only
fourteen other states had student practice rules prior to
1969. See Michael D. Ridberg, Student Practice Rules,
in CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE
LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 223. 231–64
(Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1970).
17 Id.
18 Charles E. Ares, Legal Education and the Problem of
the Poor, 17 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 310 (1965).
19 PHILIP G. SHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER,
REFLECTIONS ON CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION 1 (1998).
20 Arthur Kinoy, The Present Crisis in Legal Education,
24 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7 (1969).
The following section briefly reviews the history and types of political interference with clinic case
and client selection.
B. History of Political Interference with Clinical Programs
It is not unusual for clinical programs in the United States to be questioned by people outside of
their law schools about the clients and cases the clinics represent. Law school alumni, legislators,
university trustees, and opposing counsel or parties occasionally ask “why” a law school clinic is
providing representation to certain clients asserting legal claims.21 These inquiries often incorrectly
equate the clinic’s client representation with law school approval of support for a client’s views or
activities, and misunderstand the basic principle that a lawyer’s representation of a client is not an
endorsement of the client’s views.22 Usually, these inquires end once those raising the questions
learn more about the clinic’s teaching and service missions, and how the clinic faculty and students
are fulfilling their ethical obligation to make legal services available to clients unable to afford
lawyers or whose cause is controversial.23 When those questioning a clinic’s representation have
interests opposed to the interests of a clinic’s client, however, the inquiries may turn into attacks
on the clinic designed to interfere with or stop the clinic’s representation of its clients or
participation in specific types of cases. 
It is unclear when the first attack and political inference in a clinical program took place, but the
first documented instance of political interference appears to be attacks on the clinical program
and faculty at the University of Mississippi in 1968. State legislators and some members of the
legal community complained to university officials and the law school dean because of the clinical
program’s involvement in a school desegregation case brought by a local legal services office.24 In
response to this pressure, the university dismissed the two law faculty involved in the civil rights
litigation for refusing to cease their work with the legal services office.25 The faculty brought a
lawsuit against the university, alleging that the university permitted other law faculty to engage in
part-time law practice without any restrictions on the clients they could represent. The court
agreed that the university impermissibly treated the two faculty members differently and unequally
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21 See Joy & Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 531.
22 Ethics codes in the United States make it clear that a
lawyer’s representation of a client is not an
endorsement of a client’s views or actions. The high
court in each state adopts the lawyer ethics rules, which
are usually based on the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The ABA Model Rules provide:
“A lawyer’s representation of a client, including
representation by appointment, does not constitute an
endorsement of a client’s political, economic, social or
moral views or activities.” MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2005) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES]. The ABA Model Rules, adopted
in 1983 and amended frequently, replaced the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which the
ABA adopted in 1969 and amended in 1980.
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
(1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. More than
forty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
some version of the Model Rules. See STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3
(2005). Most of the states that have not adopted some
form of the Model Rules retain some version of the
Model Code. Id. The Model Code provides: “The
obligation of loyalty to his client applies only to a
lawyer in the discharge of his professional duties and
implies no obligation to adopt a person viewpoint
favorable to the interest or desires of his client.”
MODEL CODE, supra, at EC-17.
23 “Legal representation should not be denied to people
who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause
is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval.”
MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.2 cmt. 5. 
24 Francis B. Stevens & John L. Maxey, II, Representing
the Unrepresented: A Decennial Report on Public-
Interest Litigation in Mississippi, 44 MISS. L.J. 333,
345 (1973); Elizabeth M. Schneider & James H.
Stark, Political Interference in Law School Clinical
Programs: Report of the AALS Section on Clinical
Legal Education, Committee on Political Interference
1 n.1 (1982) (unpublished report on file with author).
25 Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499, 500–02 (5th
Cir. 1969). 
than other professors because they represented unpopular clients, and the court ordered the
university to reinstate the faculty to their teaching positions.26 In reaching its decision, the court
held that the state university could not “arbitrarily discriminate against professors in respect to the
category of clients they may represent.”27
Soon after the political interference with the work of the clinical faculty at the University of
Mississippi School of Law, the governor of Connecticut and members of the local legal
community objected to the University of Connecticut law school clinic’s representation of Viet
Nam War protestors and other unpopular clients in the early 1970s.28 The attacks included the
threat to end state funding for the law school, and the interference led to a proposal for a law
school faculty committee to select cases for the clinic.29 A clinic professor requested and received
an advisory ethics opinion from the ABA discussing the ethical propriety of the new client
screening process.30 The ABA ethics opinion stated that case-by-case prior approval by a dean or
faculty committee would interfere with the independent professional judgment of the clinical
faculty and violate the ethical obligations of the dean and faculty members by placing the clinical
faculty in a position to violate their ethical duties to clients.31 The ABA ethics opinion stated:
“Acceptance of such controversial clients and cases by legal aid clinics is in line with the highest
aspirations of the bar to make legal services available to all.”32 The law school discontinued the
screening committee after the ABA issued its opinion.33
In the 1980s, there were several more attacks on clinical programs at the state-supported law schools in
Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, and Tennessee seeking to prevent their clinical programs from filing lawsuits
against the state or political subdivisions. In 1981, the governor of Colorado vetoed legislation that
would have prohibited “law professors at the University of Colorado from assisting in litigation against
a governmental unit or political subdivision.”34 The legislation was drafted after a law professor,
working with students in a constitutional litigation seminar, filed a lawsuit challenging a nativity scene
at the Denver City and County Building claiming that the nativity scene on government property was
the government’s endorsement of religion in violation of the United States Constitution.35
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26 The court found a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution because the
law school had imposed on the clinical faculty
“restrictions that are different and more onerous than
those imposed upon other professors in the same
category.” Id. at 502. 
27 Id. at 504.
28 See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1977 n.18 (citing e-
mails from one of the clinical professors who was at
the University of Connecticut at the time of the
attacks on the clinic). The governor stated that the law
school clinic was “nothing more than an agency
designed to destroy our government and its
institutions.” Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political
Interference in Law School Clinical Programs:
Reflections on Outside Interference and Academic
Freedom, 11 J.C. & U.L. 179, 184 (1984).
29 See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1977 & n. 19.
30 ABA Comm. On Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1208 (1972).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1977 & n. 21.
Several years later, in the early 1980s, a high-ranking
state official threatened to introduce legislation to
limit the activities of the University of Connecticut
Criminal Clinic after the clinic successfully challenged
a provision of the Connecticut death penalty statute.
Schneider & Stark, supra note 24, at 2 n.4.
34 Schneider, supra note 28, at 185–86; Schneider &
Stark, supra note 24, at 2. 
35 Schneider, supra note 28, at 185; Schneider & Stark,
supra note 24, at 2 n.3. The litigation resulted in a
court order for the removal of a nativity scene at the
Denver City and County Building, enjoining the
inclusion of the nativity scene at the local government
holiday display, and the awarding of costs and
attorney fees to the plaintiff, who was represented by
the University of Colorado law professor. Citizens
Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City
and County of Denver, 481 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D.
Colo. 1979), appeal dismissed, 628 F.2d 1289 (10th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
That same year, legislation was proposed in Idaho that would have prohibited the use of state funds
for the representation of clients in litigation against the state or any political subdivision.36 This
legislation, which was not adopted, was proposed after the University of Iowa College of Law’s clinic
successfully represented prisoners in litigation against the state.37 A year later, in 1982, the Idaho
House of Representatives passed legislation that would have prohibited law faculty and students
from participating in lawsuits against the state and would have banned “courses, clinics or classes in
which a student assists or participates in any suit or litigation against the State, its agencies or its
political subdivisions.”38 The legislation, which was defeated in the state senate, was introduced after
the University of Idaho College of Law clinic challenged the proposed expansion of a highway.39
Although these early attacks on clinical programs were largely unsuccessful in limiting clinical
programs’ choice of clients and types of cases, in 1981 university officials in Tennessee imposed
restrictions on the University of Tennessee College of Law suing the state after the clinic
successfully brought a prisoner lawsuit against a state agency.40 The state attorney general filed a
motion to deny the law clinic attorney fees arguing that it was illegal to transfer funds from one
state agency to another without going through the legislative appropriations process.41 The fee
dispute was resolved by directing the attorney fees to the legal services office that housed the
clinic,42 but the university board of trustees required the clinic to separate from the legal services
office and ordered that “no suits of significance shall be brought by the UT Legal Clinic on behalf
of any litigant against the State.”43
Other early instances of political interference with law school clinic case and client selection
include litigation in which government officials argued that it would be a conflict of interest for the
state-supported Rutgers School of Law-Newark to continue to represent clients in any matter
against the state and its political subdivisions,44 and legislation to cut-off state funding for the
clinical program at the Arizona State University College of Law because of the clinic’s
representation of clients in lawsuits challenging ownership rights to riverbeds and the state prison
system’s failure to provide adequate law library materials to state inmates.45 The conflict of interest
litigation failed against the clinical program at Rutgers School of Law-Newark in 1989,46 but in the
mid-1990s the Arizona legislature successfully inserted language in the state budget that prohibited
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36 Schneider, supra note 28, at 185 & n.30; Schneider &
Stark, supra note 24, at 1.
37 See Schneider, supra note 28, at 185 n.30. See also
Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1977 n.18 (citing an e-
mail from one of the clinical professors at the
University of Iowa College of Law). 
38 Schneider, supra note 28, at 186 & n.33. 
39 Id.
40 Memorandum from the Clinic Advisory Committee to
the Faculty of the University of Tennessee College of
Law 11–12 (May 22, 1981) (on file with author). In
1977, government officials successfully pressured the
University of Tennessee’s law clinic to withdraw from a
lawsuit filed against the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) for air pollution violations, and the clinical
faculty continued representation in his private capacity.
See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5 at 1979 n.32 (citing
Telephone Interview with Dean Rivkin, Professor,
University of Tennessee College of Law (Apr. 5, 2001)).
41 Memorandum from the Clinic Advisory Committee to
the Faculty of the University of Tennessee College of
Law, supra note 40, at 11–12.
42 Id.
43 Minutes of Meeting of Board of Trustees, University
of Tennessee 6–7 (Sept. 25, 1981) (on file with
author). See also Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà vu All Over
Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of Clinical
Education, 64 TENN. L. REV. 939, 960 & n.180
(1997); Julia P. Hardin, Polishing the Lamp of
Justice: A History of Legal Education at the
University of Tennessee, 1890–1990, 57 TENN. L.
REV. 145, 193 (1990).
44 In re Executive Commission on Ethical Standards,
561 A.2d 542, 543–46 (N.J. 1989).
45 See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1980 & nn.39–40.
46 In re Executive Commission on Ethical Standards,
supra note 44, at 549. 
the Arizona State College of Law clinic from representing prisoners in any litigation against the
state – a restriction the clinic has followed ever since.47
Conditions on government funding have been a frequent, preemptive form of interference with
clinical programs. For example, the governor of Maryland imposed a requirement on the clinical
program at the University of Maryland Law School and all other legal organizations receiving state
funds that prior to filing any lawsuits against the state the entity receiving state funds must notify
the state and attempt to resolve the matter without initiating litigation in court.48 This requirement
trumps the desires of clinic clients or the litigation strategies of their lawyers. The Bureau of
Prisons has taken a similar and more absolute approach by conditioning law school clinics’ receipt
of federal funds for prison legal assistance programs with a condition that the law school clinics
shall not sue the United States or any employee of the United States.49 The Bureau of Prisons’
approach effectively bans laws schools accepting funds to provide legal assistance to prisoner-
clients seeking to use litigation against the federal government or its employees no matter how
blatant the alleged violation of prisoners’ legal rights. These types of funding restrictions
obviously apply to all legal service providers and are broader than restrictions targeted solely to
clinical programs. 
Some of the most prolonged attacks on clinical programs came in response to work of
environmental law clinics. The longest series of attacks were those attacks aimed at the University
of Oregon Law School’s Environmental Law Clinic starting in 1981 and continuing through the
early 1990s. The timber industry and government officials exerted pressure on university officials
to close the Environmental Law Clinic because of the clinic’s involvement in forest conservation
and endangered species cases.50 In response to the pressures, the President of the University of
Oregon appointed a committee to study the clinic and its use of public funds, and in 1988 the
committee issued a report finding that the clinic “fulfills its educational function extremely well,
through its advocacy serving a proper social role.”51 Similarly, the Oregon Attorney General,
responding to the request of a state legislator requesting an investigation into the propriety of state
funds supporting the clinic’s representation of clients in matters against governmental entities,
found that the “University is acting for an educational purpose it is authorized to undertake even
though there are benefits inuring to private parties.”52 Faced with continued attacks and proposed
legislative action to cut-off state funding of the law school, the Environmental Law Clinic
eventually moved all litigation activities outside of the law school to a not-for-profit environmental
law center.53
In more recent years, there were highly publicized attacks on the Environmental Law Clinic at
Tulane University Law School starting in 1993 and continuing until 1998. In 1993, the governor of
Louisiana demanded that the president of Tulane University either “shut up [the director] or get
rid of” the director of the Environmental Law Clinic after the director made public comments
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47 See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1980 & n. 41.
48 Robert Barnes, Gov. Schaefer Patches Spat With
Lawyers, WASH. POST, July 23, 1987, at B5; Kuehn
& Joy, supra note 5, at 1981 & n.44. 
49 See, e.g., Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1981 n.45
(citing letters and interviews with faculty at the
University of Southern California Law Center and
Washington and Lee University School of Law).
50 See Joy & Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 534; Kuehn &
Joy, supra note 5, at 1981–82.
51 University of Oregon School of Law, Report of the
Ad Hoc Study Committee for the Environmental Law
Clinic 15 (Nov. 30, 1985) (on file with author).
52 Oregon Attorney General OP-5498 (July 11, 1983).
53 See Joy & Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 534; Kuehn &
Joy, supra note 5, at 1982.
critical of the governor’s plan to reduce state taxes on businesses generating hazardous waste.54 The
governor threatened to pull state support for a university building project, deny state educational
assistance to residents attending Tulane, and prohibit Tulane medical schools students from
working in state hospitals.55 When the president of Tulane did not interfere with the clinic
director’s actions, the head of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality asked the
Louisiana Supreme Court to review whether the clinic was complying with the state’s student
practice rule.56 That effort also failed, and the Louisiana Supreme Court found no reason to
exercise oversight over the clinic.57
Several years later in 1997, when the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic undertook to represent a
primarily low-income, minority community’s opposition to a chemical plant, another governor,
other state officials, and business interests sought to derail the clinic’s representation in the
matter.58 At first, the attacks involved public criticism, threats to revoke the tax-exempt status of
the private non-profit law school, proposals to deny the university state educational trust fund
money, and an orchestrated effort to stop charitable donations to the university.59 Some Louisiana
employers even refused to interview or employ Tulane students as a way of increasing pressure on
the university and law school.60 When none of these pressure tactics proved successful at stopping
the clinic’s representation of its clients, the government officials and business groups succeeded in
persuading a majority of the elected justices to the Louisiana Supreme court to impose severe
restrictions on the student practice rule aimed at preventing future representation of community
groups.61 The amended rule imposes very restrictive income guidelines for clinic client eligibility,
requires that at least 51% of an organization’s members must meet the guidelines, prohibits
contact with potential clients through community education or other outreach efforts, and
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54 Michael Dehncke, Life in Louisiana, TULANE
LAW SCHOOL DICTA (New Orleans, La.), Oct.
25, 1993, at 1 (quoting Governor Edwin Edwards of
Louisiana) (on file with author).
55 Id.
56 Letter from Kai David Midboe, Secretary, Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality, to Pascal F.
Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court
(Oct. 15, 1993) (on file with author). See also Bob
Anderson, “Politics” Prompted Protest of TU Law
Clinic, Official Says, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge,
La.), Oct. 19, 1993, at 1B.
57 Letter from Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice,
Louisiana Supreme Court, to Kai David Midboe,
Secretary, Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality (Nov. 18, 1993) (on file with author). See
also, Bob Anderson, High Court Rejects Midboe
Request on Law Clinic Restraints, ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge, La.), Feb. 4, 1994, at 12C.
58 See Joy, supra note 6, at 243–47.
59 See id.
60 See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1893 n.58 and
accompanying text. There have been reports that the
prosecutor in Houston has discriminated against
University of Houston law students who have
participated in the law school’s Innocence Network, a
clinic that represents wrongfully convicted inmates.
See Rebecca Luczycki, DA Hiring Policies
Questioned, NAT’L JURIST, Oct. 2002, at 27; John
Suval, Innocence Lost, HOUSTON PRESS, July 4,
2002, at 13. The prosecutor’s office denies that it
discriminates against law students who have
participated in the clinic. See id.
61 Various business groups sent letters to the Louisiana
Supreme Court demanding that the Court investigate
the Tulane Environmental Clinic and change the
student practice rule. See Letter from Daniel L.
Juneau, President, Louisiana Association of Business
and Industry, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of Louisiana (Sept. 9, 1997) (on file
with author); Letter from Erik F. Johnsen, Chairman,
Business Council of New Orleans and the River
Region, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of Louisiana (Sept. 9, 1997) (on file
with author); Letter from Robert H. Gayle, Jr.,
President and Chief Executive Officer, The
Chamber/New Orleans and the River Region, to
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court
of Louisiana (Sept. 9, 1997) (on file with author). The
letter writing campaign seeking changes to the student
practice rule was an idea generated at a meeting with
Governor Mike Foster of Louisiana where business
leaders were urged “to send a series of letters to the
Louisiana Supreme Court.” Shintech’s Secret Backer,
COUNTERPUNCH, Nov. 16–30, 1997, at 2, 2–3.
prohibits clinic students from appearing in a representative capacity before a legislature.62 The
restrictions make Louisiana’s student practice rule the “most restrictive student practice rule in the
nation.”63 A challenge to the restrictions on constitutional grounds was rejected by the federal
courts.64
After the attacks on the Tulane clinical program, there were highly publicized attacks on the
University of Pittsburgh Environmental Law Clinic, for the representation of community groups
that were seeking to block the sale of timber in a national forest in 2001,65 and for representation
of a community organization raising environmental concerns over the plans for a new highway in
2002.66 The attacks on the clinic at the University of Pittsburgh involved state legislators and
business groups, and the first set of attacks succeeded in convincing the state legislature to pass a
budget measure, which the governor signed, prohibiting taxpayer funds to be used to support the
Environmental Law Clinic.67 Relying on private funds, the clinic continued and experienced
further attacks in which opponents, using the threat of cutting off all state aid for the public
university, sought to have university officials fire the director and close the clinic.68 Although
university officials originally took actions to force the clinic out of the law school, they abandoned
giving into the political interference after the university’s academic freedom and tenure committee
found that the proposal to force the clinic to leave the law school infringed on academic freedom.69
Another recent attack on a clinical program has come from a state legislator, the local media, and
others against the Civil Rights Project at the University of North Dakota for representing clients
challenging a display of a monument of the ten commandments on city property.70 Among the
Political Interference in Clinical Programs: Lessons From The U.S. Experience
93
62 See La. Sup. Ct. R XX (1999). 
63 Letter from Carl C. Monk, Executive Director,
Association of American Law Schools, to Murphy J.
Foster, Governor, State of Louisiana 1 (Aug. 21,
1998) (on file with author).
64 S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court
of La., 61 F.Supp. 2d 499 (E.D. La. 1999), aff’d,
252 F.3d. 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 995
(2001).
65 Senator Wants to Punish Pitt for Logging Suit, PA. L.
WKLY., May 28, 2001, at 9; Jim Eckstrom, Scarnati
Prepared to Hit U. Pittsburgh Where it Counts –
Budget, BRADFORD ERA (Bradford, Pa.), May 23,
2001. See also Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at
1985–86.
66 Don Hopey, Law Clinic at Pitt Feeling Pressure,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 2001,
at B-1; Johnna A. Pro, Road Group Targets Law
Clinic at Pitt, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Aug. 24, 2001, at B-4. See also Kuehn & Joy, supra
note 5, at 1986–88.
67 State Senator Gets Symbolic Rebuke of Pitt Professor,
Associated Press Newswires, June 23, 2001,
WESTLAW, PANEWS library.
68 Frank Irey Jr., Pitt Should Drop Client that Opposes
Expressway, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Sept. 19, 2001, at E-2 (letter to editor from the
President, Mon Valley Progress Council). See also
Kuehn & Joy, supra note 5, at 1986–87.
69 University of Pittsburgh Senate, Report of the Tenure
and Academic Freedom Committee on the
Environmental Law Clinic (Jan. 28, 2002) (on file
with author); Don Hopey & Bill Schackner, Faculty
Rips Pitt, Defends Law Clinic, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 2003, at B-1; Don
Hopey & Bill Schackner, In Reversal, Pitt Decides to
Keep Law Clinic Going, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Mar. 15, 2002, at A-1.
70 See Chuck Haga, City is Sued to Remove Religious
Monument: Fargo’s Ten Commandments Plaque is at
Issue, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Oct.
30, 2003, at 1A. The clinic represented citizens
objecting to a ten commandment monument on city
property as constituting the government’s endorsement
of religion in violation of the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which states: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . . U.S. Const. amend. I. The clinic’s
representation of the clients in the controversial case
prompted a state legislator to seek an investigation
charging that the clinic’s representation against the
municipality was “a totally inappropriate use of
public funds.” Tony Lucia, U. North Dakota Law
School Criticized for Taking Ten Commandments
Case, UNIVERSITY WIRE, Sept. 15, 2003. A local
newspaper supported the representative’s efforts and
called for the “university to rein in its law school.”
UND Should Rein In Its Law School, BISMARK
TRIBUNE, Sept. 4, 2003, A4. Responding to
criticisms, the interim dean of the law school stated
tactics employed to stop the clinic from representing its clients was a request from the state
lawmaker for the North Dakota Attorney General to investigate whether the state supported law
school’s clinic could represent individuals with claims against the state or its political
subdivisions.71 The Attorney General issued an opinion finding that the clinic was acting legally
and that “the legal clinic’s representation of the client does not constitute the state or University’s
position on the underlying subject matter.”72 The Attorney General also found that “the North
Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct support the principle that controversial or unpopular
clients should not be denied legal representation.”73
After the Attorney General issued his opinion, someone who had made “several harassing
statements” toward the clinic director and the clinical program because of the ten commandment
case sued the director and the clinic alleging viewpoint discrimination when the clinic declined to
provide legal assistance to him.74 The clinic declined to represent him due to lack of time and
resources, and also because of curricular and ethical reasons. The clinic director “determined that
the clinic would not be able to establish an effective client-attorney relations with him based on . .
. [his] antagonistic position against her personally and the clinical program.”75 Although his case
was dismissed at the federal district court level at the beginning of the litigation, the court of
appeals has ruled that the district dismissed the case prematurely.76 Reconsideration of this ruling
has been sought, and the matter will be remanded to the district court for additional proceedings
if the court of appeals does not reconsider the matter.
This brief history into the nature and types of attacks on clinical programs is part of what one
commentator, writing in 1984, characterized as “a broader war on legal services and public interest
legal groups” in the United States.77 That connection between the attacks on public interest
lawyers and clinical programs has been repeatedly made since that time by others, and the next
section examines some of the larger issues of access to justice and attacks on lawyers serving those
otherwise unable to afford legal assistance in order to place the attacks on clinical programs in
context.
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that the law school did not seek out controversial cases,
“[b]ut as attorneys, we’re not supposed to refuse to take
cases just because they’re controversial. When you
think about it, that would have a devastating effect on
a person’s ability to attain an attorney.” Brenden
Timpe, N.D. Attorney General Sides with U. North
Dakota Law School’s Representation, UNIVERSITY
WIRE, Sept. 30, 2003.
71 N.D. Attorney General Op. 2003-L-42 (Sept. 26,
2003).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Washington University School of Law, CLEA
Newsletter, Feb. 2005, at 43 (on file with author).
75 Id.
76 Wishnatsky v. Rovner, 433 F.3d 608, 612–13 (2006) 
77 Schneider, supra note 28, at 180. Professor Elizabeth
Schneider may have been the first commentator to
observe that interference in clinical programs bringing
public interest litigation has been part of the attacks
on public interest lawyers throughout the United
States. 
II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND ATTACKS ON PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERS
Access to the courts is generally accepted to be a precondition for justice, and equal access to
justice and equality of justice are among the most fundamental principles of a democratic
society.78 Individuals and groups customarily must have lawyers representing them to assert rights
before courts and administrative agencies and without lawyers to advocate for them their rights are
usually lost.79 Indeed, fairness in a legal proceeding assumes a meaningful opportunity to be heard,
and the right to be heard is often an empty promise if legal representation is not available.80
Despite the promises of equal justice and access in the United States, the poor are not entitled to
the assistance of a lawyer if they cannot afford to hire one except in criminal cases.81 Those
individuals and families with incomes at or below 125% of the poverty level as defined by the
federal government are eligible for federally funded legal services through the Legal Services
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78 These principles are repeated often in the United
States, and underlie the motto “Equal Justice Under
Law,” which is inscribed above the entrance to the
United States Supreme Court Building. Former United
States Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell explained,
“Equal justice under law is not just a caption on the
facade of the Supreme Court building. It is perhaps the
most inspiring ideal of our society . . . It is fundamental
that justice should be the same, in substance and
availability, without regard to economic status.” Scott
S. Brinkmeyer, Are the Doors to the Courthouse Really
Open?, 83 MICH. B.J. 12, 13 (2004) (quoting Lewis
Powell, Address to the ABA Legal Services Program,
ABA Annual Meeting (1976)). “If we are to keep our
democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou
shalt not ration justice.” In re Smiley, 330 N.E. 2d 53,
63 N.Y. 1975) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Learned Hand, Address Before the Legal Aid Society
of New York (1951)). [footnote to be completed with
citation to international sources]
79 Professor Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn have
explained: The lawyer’s function is essentially that of
presenting a grievance so that those aspects of the
complaint which entitle a person to a remedy can be
communicated effectively and properly to a person with
power to provide a remedy. . . . [I]t is altogether
possible that for many a remedy is available if the
grievance is properly presented. . . . Edgar S. Cahn &
Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1336 (1964).
80 “At the very heart of our recognition of the right to
counsel elsewhere has been our articulated conviction
that the right to be heard would be of little avail of it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.” Smiley,
330 N.E. 2d at 59 (Jones, J., dissenting) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting People ex rel. Menechino v.
Warden, 267 N.E. 2d 238, 241 (N.Y. 1971)).
81 The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to ... be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him ... and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI, 1.
The landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright
interpreted this language to mean that defendants have
a right to counsel at all criminal trials where
incarceration was possible. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“Any person hauled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”).
Subsequent to the Gideon decision, the Supreme Court
refused to extend the constitutional right to counsel in
civil matters holding that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the appointment of
counsel only where denial would prove
“fundamentally unfair.” Lassiter v. Dept. of Social
Services, 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). The fundamental
fairness test in Lassiter requires an inquiry into “the
private interests at stake, the government’s interest,
and the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions.” Id. at 27. Few judges have been
reversed for finding that counsel is not required under
this test. Deborah L. Rhode, The Constitution of
Equal Citizenship for a Good Society: Access to
Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1798 (2001). 
In many states, however, case law, legislation, or
constitutional provisions guarantee the assistance of
counsel in some criminal matters where incarceration
is not possible, some quasi-criminal matters, or some
civil proceedings. See, e.g., In re Miller, 585 N.E. 2d
396, 400 (1992) (holding that involuntary
commitment is a sufficient deprivation of liberty
requiring at lawyer for due process protection); In re
Adoption of R.I., 312 A.2d 601, 603 (Pa. 1973),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1032 (1977) (holding that an
individual is entitled to representation by counsel when
contesting proceeding to terminate parental rights).
See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman,
Toward a More Effective Right to Assistance of
Counsel: Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 31
(1995); Randolph N. Stone, The Role of State Funded
Programs in Legal Representation of Indigent
Defendants in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 205, 207 (1993).
Corporation (LSC),82 but the LSC estimates that it handles only some of the legal problems for
approximately 20% of those eligible.83 Professor David Luban estimates that there are only 4000
legal-aid lawyers plus an estimated 1000 to 2000 additional lawyers representing the poor in the
United States.84 As a result, “[a]n estimated four-fifths of the legal needs of the poor, and the needs
of two-to three-fifths of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.”85
In the context of the very limited legal services for the poor in the United States, efforts to limit or
prohibit the legal services provided by clinical programs are particularly troubling, and they are part
of the same attacks and restrictions experienced by others providing legal assistance to the poor.86
Similar attacks and often more serious restrictions have been directed to LSC and aid to public
interest lawyers through Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTA) programs. A brief review of
the attacks on LSC and IOLTA demonstrates the similarity with the attacks on clinical programs.
A. Restrictions on LSC Recipients
Federal funding restrictions on the LSC have long prohibited the LSC from providing
representation to clients on controversial issues such as abortion, but in 1996 the United States
Congress enacted even greater restrictions. Today, LSC-funded lawyers may not participate in any
class action litigation, may not collect court-awarded attorney’s fees, litigate on behalf of anyone
incarcerated, or represent various classes of non-citizens, many of who have legal immigration
status.87 In addition, LSC-funded lawyers may not be involved in election redistricting cases,
evictions from public housing of persons allegedly involved with drugs, or attempts to influence
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82 See Legal Services Corp., Serving the Civil Legal
Needs of Low-Income Americans 1 (2000), at
http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/EXSUM.pdf [hereinafter
Serving Civil Legal Needs] (last visited June 17,
2005). The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was
created by the federal government in 1974 and
“charged by Congress ‘to provide equal access to the
system of justice in our Nation for individuals who
seek redress of grievances’ and ‘to provide high quality
legal assistance to those who would otherwise be
unable to afford adequate legal counsel.’” Id. In 2000,
approximately 34.5 million Americans lived in
households with incomes below the poverty level, and
an additional 10 million more had incomes between
100% and 125% of the poverty level, thereby making
them eligible for LSC legal assistance. Id. at 12. 
83 Nationwide Survey of the Civil Legal Needs of the
Poor 4, in TWO NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989
PILOT ASSESSMENTS OF THE UNMET
LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR AND OF THE
PUBLIC GENERALLY (American Bar Ass’n
1989).
84 David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The
Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 209, 211 (2003).
85 Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law:
Connecting Principle to Practice, 12 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 47, 47 (2003). See also Roger C. Cramton,
Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113,
1121 (1991) (“But informed observers agree that there
remains a tremendous unmet need, estimated at 75%
to as much as 95% of the total legal needs of the
poor.”) In the United States, “approximately 35.8
million people lived below the poverty line in 2003, or
about 12.5 percent of the population.” Tyche
Hendricks, Number Living in Poverty Grows as
Middle-class Incomes Stay Flat, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Aug. 27, 2004, at A20. Various studies
support the view that most of the legal needs of those
living at or near the poverty level are not being met by
the legal system in the United States. See, e.g.,
ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AGENDA FOR
ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND
CIVIL JUSTICE 1–2 (American Bar Ass’n 1996)
(presenting survey results of the nearly 20% of the
households eligible for federally funded legal services);
Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of
Americans 23 (American Bar Ass’n 1994) (finding
that the legal system does not address approximately
71% of the legal problems of low-income households). 
86 See note 77 and accompanying text.
87 Serving Civil Legal Needs, supra note 82, at 2.
Congress originally imposed a prohibition on litigation
to challenge existing welfare laws, but the Supreme
Court ruled that provision as viewpoint discrimination
in violation of the First Amendment. Legal Servs.
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547–48 (2001).
Challenges of other restrictions on equal protection
and due process bases failed. See Legal Aid Soc. of
Haw. v. Legal Serv. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir.
1998); Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 164 F3d 757
(2d Cir. 1999).
government rulemaking or the enactment of laws.88 Those receiving LSC funds are also prohibited
from using any nonfederal funds to fund any prohibited legal representation.89
Some of these restrictions also have the effect of making it more costly and time consuming for
LSC lawyers to pursue certain claims. For example, the restrictions require LSC lawyers to litigate
individual cases when a class action case would be more efficient, thus presenting LSC lawyers with
the choice of engaging in redundant litigation or turning away the individual cases that would be
most amenable to class action representation.90 The ban on receiving attorney fees also deprives
LSC offices of supplemental funds that could be used to represent more clients. When LSC
lawyers do litigate in matters where attorney fees are possible, the Congressional ban on seeking
attorney fees also removes some of the incentives for defendants to resolve cases quickly or to
enter into settlement discussions because defendants will not have to pay reasonable attorney fees
for the work done by the LSC lawyers representing successful clients.
As a result of the LSC restrictions, whole groups of otherwise income eligible persons with
cognizable legal claims are denied legal representation and an opportunity to have their claims
presented. Even those individuals who are not barred from receiving legal representation find that
they cannot have a lawyer for certain types of legal problems, nor have a lawyer assist them in
asking legislators or other government officials from creating systematic solutions and preventative
measures to reoccurring problems through changes in the laws and rules. 
Because of the restrictions on the LSC and the LSC’s ability to assist only a small fraction of those
who are income eligible because of inadequate funding, other forms of legal assistance for the poor
become even more importation. But, the attacks on public interest lawyers have extended to the
other means of providing lawyers for the poor.
B. Legal Challenges to IOLTA Programs Funding Civil Legal Services
IOLTA programs are an important source of funding for public interest lawyers providing civil
legal services to the poor in the United States. Clients funds that are too small to be placed in
individual trust accounts, or held for too short of a period of time to earn interest for individual
clients after paying bank fees, are placed in pooled IOLTA accounts where the funds generate
interest that is used to support non-governmental organizations providing public interest lawyers.91
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88 Serving Civil Legal Needs, supra note 82, at 2.
89 Id.
90 Professor David Luban has described this dilemma
and suggests that it is more likely that rather than
litigate numerous individual cases, LSC lawyers will
turn those cases down that creating a “perverse result:
the more poor people a legal problem affects, the less
likely they are going to find a lawyer to represent
them.” Luban, supra note 84, at 223.
91 The fiduciary obligations of a lawyer require that the
lawyer hold client funds separate from the lawyer’s
funds. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at
R.1.15(a) (“A lawyer shall hold property of clients or
third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in
connection with a representation separate from the
lawyer’s own property.”); Model Code, supra note 22,
at DR 9-102 (“All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or
law firm, other than advances for costs and expenses,
shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank
accounts maintained in the state in which the law
office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer
or law firm shall be deposited therein . . . .”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 44(1) (stating that a
lawyer must hold property in which a client has or
claims an interest “separate from the lawyer’s
property”); National Legal Aid & Defender
Association, Fact Sheet on Interest on Lawyers’ Trust
Accounts (IOLTA), at http://www.nlada.org/DMS
/ D o c u m e n t s / 1 0 1 1 3 0 0 7 4 9 . 7 5 / - F a c t % 2 0
Sheet%20on%20IOLTA.PDF (last visited June 17,
2005) (describing IOLTA accounts). 
IOLTA programs were made possible by changes in
banking laws and regulations that permitted the
pooling of funds into a single interest bearing account
There are IOLTA programs in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and together they rank
second only to the LSC in funding legal services for the poor.92 Yet, there have been a number of
legal challenges to IOLTA programs funding civil legal services.
Although there have been attacks on IOLTA programs since the 1980s,93 the Washington Legal
Foundation (WLF), known for litigating free-enterprise and property rights issues, has been the
principal opponent to IOLTA in recent years.94 In a succession of cases litigated in several states,95
WLF challenged IOLTA programs as an impermissible “taking” of private property under the
United States Constitution.96 As a result of the litigation to date, the United States Supreme Court
ruled in one case “that the interest income generated by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the
‘private property’ of the owner of the principal.”97 In a second and more recent case, the Court
held that even if the IOLTA program was a per se taking, the taking was for a legitimate public use
and “compensation is measured by the owner’s pecuniary loss – which is zero.”98 The Court
reached the conclusion that the WLF clients had no cognizable pecuniary loss based on the lower
court’s finding that if the individual client funds were substantial enough “to make any net return,
they would not be subject to the IOLTA program.”99
The Court’s decisions in the WLF cases still leave open the question of whether or not IOLTA
programs violate the First Amendment rights of those challenging the programs because their
property generates the funds supporting litigation with which they may disagree.100 In a dissenting
opinion, one Supreme Court Justice noted that the First Amendment issue had not yet been
addressed by the Court and he predicted: “One constitutional violation (the taking of property)
likely will lead to another (compelled speech). These matters may have to come before the Court
in due course.”101 In a statement issued after the last Supreme Court decision, the WLF stated that
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that were adopted in the early 1980s. Prior to this time,
small or short-term client funds were kept in non-
interest bearing accounts and the banks benefited from
the use of the funds held interest free. See Fact Sheet
on Interest on Lawyers’ Trust Accounts (IOLTA),
supra. When a client’s funds are substantial enough to
net interest after the payment of banking fees, lawyers
should place those funds in a separate trust account for
the benefit of the client. 
92 IOLTA programs generated over $139 million in
1999. Fact Sheet on Interest on Lawyers’ Trust
Accounts (IOLTA), supra note 91. The budget for
LSC was $335 million in 2004. National Legal Aid
& Defender Association, President’s FY 2005 Budget
Request Remains the Same, at http://www.nlada.org/-
Civil/NLADA_News/2004030130394725 (last
visited June 20, 2005).
93 See, e.g., Luban, supra note 84, at 227 & n.70
(describing and citing early litigation against IOLTA
programs).
94 The Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) also sided
with the business interests attacking the Tulane
Environmental Clinic. See infra note 104 and
accompanying text. 
95 See Luban, supra note 84, at 228–34 (describing
Washington Legal Foundation litigation against
IOLTA in Massachusetts, Texas, and Washington).
Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) literature states
that WLF “has been battling IOLTA programs on
behalf of property owners since 1991.” Washington
Legal Foundation, Litigation Update: Supreme Court
Rejects Challenge to Confiscatory IOLTA Programs
(Apr. 4, 2003), at http://www.wlf.org/upload/4-4-
03IOLTA.pdf (last visited June 20, 2005).
96 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states
“nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend V.
97 Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156,
172 (1998).
98 Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 240
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Mar. 31, 2003, at A5.
99 Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. at 240
(citing Washington Legal Foundation v. Legal
Foundation of Washington, No. C97-0146C (WD
Wash., Jan. 30, 1998), App. to Pet. for Cert. 94a).
100 Id. at 228 (stating that one of the claims raised by the
WLF was a First Amendment issue).
101 Id. at 253 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
“WLF is consulting with its clients to determine whether they wish to continue to pursue their
First Amendment claims.”102
Whether WLF challenges to IOLTA on First Amendment grounds will materialize remains to be
seen. Even some supporters of the WLF’s Takings Clause challenges acknowledge that a successful
First Amendment challenge would be very difficult.103 Still, WLF and others have been challenging
IOLTA programs almost from their inception, and there is no clear sign that litigation against
IOLTA funding civil legal services will cease. Indeed, the WLF’s attack on public interest lawyers
appears to be broader than just attacks on IOLTA programs. For example, the WLF sided with the
business groups seeking changes in the Louisiana student practice rule to stop the Tulane
Environmental Clinic from representing community groups by filing an amicus brief in federal
court arguing that the restrictions on clinic students’ ability to represent indigent clients are
appropriate.104
III. THE LEGACY OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE ON CLINICAL
PROGRAMS
The history and description of political interference in clinical programs demonstrate that in some
instances restrictions have been imposed that foreclose particular clinical programs from
representing certain clients, advancing some legal claims for clients, or engaging in litigation
strategies against some parties.105 These are the same types of restrictions imposed on the LSC.
The restrictions on clinic case and client selection also have the effect of essentially cutting off
funding for the legal representation to the poor, one of the goals of challenges to IOLTA programs. 
In addition to the formal restrictions that have been imposed on some clinical programs,
commentators suggest that perhaps a greater number of clinical programs have imposed their own
internal restrictions and “have refused to represent certain controversial cases or clients because of
fears that taking such cases could result in threats to their continued operation.”106 For example,
commenting on the attacks to the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, the director of one of the
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105 See supra Part I.B. for a discussion of restrictions that
have been imposed on some clinical programs.
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largest clinical programs in the United States reportedly stated that her program is “very careful
about the cases it accepts” and that it “tries to avoid high-profile cases.”107
It is important to recognize, however, that most of the work of clinical programs in the United
States involves the representation of individual clients in matters that have been described as “one-
client-at-a-time, more-or-less routine, direct-client representation.”108 In addition, some of the
cases that triggered political attacks, such as prison litigation to gain access to library resources for
inmates,109 may not have seemed like a controversial case when the clinic first undertook the
representation. What makes a case controversial often has less to do with the case itself, and more
to do with the reaction of a government official, opposing counsel, or an interested party. 
The breadth of the attacks on clinical programs, in both public and private law schools, for the
different types of cases handled “demonstrates that no law clinic program is immune from such
assaults.”110
Still, those clinical programs that intentionally take some challenging cases that may be
controversial in order to provide clinic students with the exposure to more complex legal issues
run a greater risk of being targeted for political interference. This is particularly troubling because
of the long history in the Unites States of published court decisions in which clinical law students
and faculty represented individuals with regard to important issues such as access to the courts in
forma pauperis,111 challenging discrimination in radio broadcast licensing,112 sex discrimination in
employment,113 supporting municipal nuisance ordinances,114 asserting the civil rights of the
homeless,115 representing inmates in civil rights cases against municipalities and police for
intentionally violating their Miranda rights,116 and other important cases.117
It is undeniable that political interference in clinical programs in the United States has taken its toll
not only on those clinics that have been targeted but also on other law school clinics. The public
attacks on law school clinical programs represent just a small percentage of the less well publicized
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questions clinical programs more frequently face over the clients and cases clinics represent.118
Each phone call or letter to a clinic director, law school dean, or university official questioning a
clinic’s involvement in the case raises the possibility that the questions may turn into pressure to
force the clinic to end its representation of a client in need, to refuse to represent such clients in
the future, or to avoid representing any client against more powerful parties such as governmental
entities or large businesses. Both the public, prolonged attacks on clinical programs and the more
frequent phone calls and letters questioning clinics’ representation of clients send a message to
clinical programs that representation of almost any client, and particularly unpopular clients or
controversial causes, may come at a cost. When viewed in connection with the attacks on the LSC
and IOLTA, the political interference in clinical programs also demonstrate that those who
ultimately suffer the most are the potential clients whose rights are being lost due to the lack of
legal representation.119
In many ways, interference with clinical programs operate like SLAPP suits – Strategic Lawsuit
Against Public Participation. In SLAPP suits, citizens in the United States protesting corporate
policies, business developments, or even complaining against teachers or police, may face lawsuits
for defamation or tortuous interference with business. Although nearly all SLAPP suits are
dismissed before trial, the SLAPP suits are designed to intimidate opposition by causing those
protesting to incur large legal fees and to fear possible personal liability.120 Because of fear of
SLAPP suites, citizen participation is often stifled. The ultimate aim of those interfering with
clinical programs is also one of intimidation – to cause clinical faculty, law school deans, and
university administrators to drop cases and to avoid taking cases against certain businesses or
governmental entities. To the degree that clinical faculty screen out cases that would otherwise
make good clinic cases because faculty fear that the cases may be trigger interference, the faculty
succumb to ultimate aim of those seeking to block legal representation for anyone challenging their
actions.
Experience in the Unites States has shown that cultivating support for clinical programs among
non-clinical faculty and law school deans is key to withstanding political interference. Such support
generally flows from explaining what the clinic does, and how cases are selected based on
pedagogical values and, when it is a goal of a clinic, the legal needs of the community. It is also
good to cultivate contacts with the local media, and to explain to them the important work that
the clinic is doing. It is not unusual in the United States for clinical programs to be the focus of
human interest stories. It is best to have the support for clinical programs in place prior to an
instance of interference, and it is important to resist the interference. Pointing out that the
interference is seeking to deny access to the courts for those unable to hire attorneys is often a
hook that some in the media use to characterize the conflict.
The full extent of direct and indirect pressure on clinical faculty to restrict their client and case
selection is not known, but there are sufficient examples to illustrate that this is a problem, at least
in the United States. Whether and to what extent clinical faculty in other countries face or will face
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similar issues of political interference in the clients they represent are questions that existing
scholarship and news reports do not answer.121 In contrast to the United States, the Australian
states, Canada, New Zealand, European countries, and some other nations have different schemes
for providing legal assistance to individuals in civil matters which may make legal counsel more
available for lower income persons than it is in the United States.122 The greater availability of legal
counsel to those unable to hire attorneys in other countries may possibly mute or tend to
discourage attacks on clinical programs providing representation to those with low incomes. There
may also be some different cultural norms against attacking access to the courts in other countries
that may prevent some attacks on clinical programs. Nevertheless, clinical faculty in other
countries may find that understanding the experience of attacks on clinical programs in the United
States will be helpful in addressing this issue should their clinical programs become the targets of
similar political attacks.
CONCLUSION
An essential cornerstone of any society based on the rule of law is access to the courts.123 In a
functioning democracy, access to the courts is access to justice, and an individual’s right to sue and
to defend against actions taken by the state or others becomes “the right that protects all other
rights.”124 Thus, in many countries the most pressing issues are the fairness of the judicial system
and the allocation and delivery of legal services – conditions necessary for an effective rule of law.
The political interference in clinical programs affects the ability of law school clinics to provide
access to the courts to traditionally underrepresented individuals, families, and groups. When
efforts to limit the types of clients or causes clinical programs are successful, they effectively close
the courthouse doors to those unable to find other legal representation. In this way, political
interference in clinical programs is a maneuver designed to subvert the normal processes of the
rule of law.
Political interference in clinical programs, like the attacks on other programs providing lawyers for
the low income persons and community groups in the United States, has been called a “silencing
doctrine” or “extralegal strategy” because these attacks are deliberate attempts to deny those
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unable to hire attorneys the opportunity to have access to the courts.125 These efforts seek to
transcend the normal legal processes available to all in theory by limiting access to justice in reality
only to those who can afford to hire attorneys. When these efforts to limit access to the courts are
successful, the rule of law is eroded. 
Law school clinical programs play important roles in educating law students and in providing
access to the courts for many in need. Because law school clinics are places where law students
often receive their first exposure to the practice of law, the clinic law office should be a model
ethical law office, and the clinical faculty and other lawyers in those offices should model the
highest ethical practice and norms of the legal profession. By evaluating potential cases on the legal
merits and their pedagogical values, and by agreeing to represent clients even when a case may
become controversial, clinical faculty and their programs can model the highest ideals of legal
profession.
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